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Abstract
This paper develops and analyzes a welfare maximizing model of infant industry protection.
The domestic infant industry is competitive and experiences dynamic learning eﬀects that are
external to ￿rms. The competitive foreign industry is mature and produces a good that is
an imperfect substitute for the domestic good. A government planner can protect the infant
industry using domestic production subsidies, tariﬀs, or quotas in order to maximize domestic
welfare over time. As protection is not always optimal (even though the domestic industry
experiences a learning externality), the paper shows how the decision to protect the industry
should depend on the industry￿s learning potential, the shape of the learning curve, and the
degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods.
Assuming some reasonable restrictions on the ￿exibility over time of the policy instruments,
the paper subsequently compares the eﬀectiveness of the diﬀerent instruments. Given such
restrictions, the paper shows that quotas induce higher welfare levels than tariﬀs. In some
cases, the dominance of the quota is so pronounced that it compensates for any amount of
government revenue loss related to the administration of the quota (inclusing the case of a
voluntary export restraint, where no revenue is collected). In similar cases, the quota may even
be preferred to a domestic production subsidy.
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The infant industry argument is one of the oldest arguments used to justify the protection of
industries from international trade. First formulated by Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List at
the beginning of the Nineteenth Century, the case for infant industry protection has been generally
accepted by economists over the last two centuries ￿ although some of the arguments supporting
protection have come under successful attacks over the years. In his famous statement supporting
the case for infant industry protection, John Stuart Mill alluded to one of the main pre-requisites for
such industries: the presence of dynamic learning eﬀects that are external to ￿rms.1 Mill recognized
that certain additional conditions must also be met in order to justify protection. He speci￿cally
mentioned that protection must be temporary and that the infant industry must then mature
and become viable without protection. Subsequently, Charles Francis Bastable added another
condition requiring that the cumulative net bene￿ts provided by the protected industry exceed
the cumulative costs of protection.2 Together, these conditions are known as the Mill-Bastable
Test. The economics literature has subsequently developed formal models with dynamic learning
externalities demonstrating how protection can potentially raise welfare. This literature has also
shown that the protection provided by production subsidies is preferable to that provided by tariﬀs
or quotas, as the latter additionally distort consumption. Nevertheless, production subsidies may
not be feasible due to government ￿scal constraints and distortions associated with raising the
needed revenue.
Now consider the problems encountered by a government planner who wishes to follow these
relatively straightforward recommendations when deciding on a speci￿c policy for an infant indus-
try characterized by the previously mentioned learning eﬀects. Though clear and intuitive, the
Mill-Bastable Test is hard to apply in practice: both the bene￿ts and costs of protection change
over time as learning progresses. The cumulative bene￿ts and costs not only re￿ect the changes
driven by the learning process but also those caused by the adjustment over time of the level of
protection (typically, the latter decreases as learning progresses). Recommendations for the pol-
icy instrument choice (subsidy, tariﬀ, or quota) are equally clear but also greatly complicated by
practical considerations. The recommendations are based on the assumption that the level of the
policy instrument can be costlessly changed over time. In fact, these changes are costly and may
1See Mill (1848, pp. 918-19). The full statement is re-printed in Kemp (1960).
2See Bastable (1891, pp. 140-143). For further discussion of the Mill-Bastable Test, see Kemp (1960) and Corden
(1997, ch. 8).
1not even be feasible over certain time intervals.3 How do these considerations aﬀect the government
planner￿s choice of policy instrument?
This paper seeks to answer this question and assist the government planner with the applica-
tion of the Mill-Bastable Test. The paper shows how the cumulative costs of protection can be
approximated by a ￿xed learning cost that can be readily compared to an appropriately normalized
bene￿t ￿ow. The paper describes how the ful￿llment of the test depends on the industry￿s learning
potential, the speed of learning, and the degree of substitutability between the domestic and foreign
goods. When the test has been met, the paper then shows how the presence of adjustment costs
and uncertainty concerning the learning curve confer an advantage to the quota over the other two
policy instruments. In particular, the quota will almost always yield higher welfare outcomes than
the tariﬀ. In some cases, the dominance of the quota is so pronounced that it compensates for any
amount of government revenue loss related to the administration of the quota. (This is true even
in the extreme case of a voluntary export restraint (VER), when no revenue is collected.) It is
further shown that the quota may even be preferred to domestic production subsidies. Brie￿y, the
advantage of the quota vis-a-vis the subsidy or tariﬀ is that its level of protection automatically
declines as learning progresses (a desired property for welfare maximization). On the other hand,
the tariﬀ and subsidy must be adjusted downward to produce this eﬀect. This adjustment requires
additional information about the pace of learning (which may not be known with certainty) and
m a yb ec o s t l yo re v e ni n f e a s i b l e .
Other recent work has also challenged the view that necessarily attributes the use of quantity
restrictions (which is widespread) to non-welfare-maximizing behavior by governments.4 This work
has shown how some relevant considerations aﬀecting the implementation of trade policies can lead
welfare maximizing governments to choose quantity restrictions. Feenstra and Lewis (1991) show
that VERs are negotiated by governments in order to credibly signal the level of domestic political
pressure to their trading partner. Anderson and Schmitt (2003) show that governments may resort
to quotas after having cooperatively negotiated tariﬀ levels. Finally, Bagwell and Staiger (1990)
show that trade policies involving quantity restrictions may allow non-cooperative governments to
enforce trade agreements over the business cycle. The current paper seeks to complement this work
by providing another realistic example where welfare maximizing governments may choose quantity
3The cost or incapacity to adjust the policy instrument may be driven by actual costs and political procedures or
alternatively by the capture of the political process (once the policy is implemented) by special interest groups.
4These models are reviewed in Deardorﬀ (1987). Political economy models that explain the use of trade policies
as a voting or lobbying equilibrium also fall within this category.
2restrictions over other trade policy instruments.
2 Learning-by-Doing and Infant Industry Protection
I assume that the infant industry￿s dynamic learning occurs through learning-by-doing. The infant
industry argument based on this type of learning externality was ￿rst explicitly modeled in a dy-
namic framework by Bardhan (1971). His single industry model has since been extended to analyze
the consequences of learning in more than one industry. Clemhout and Wan (1970) study infant
industry protection policies for a group of industries that experience diﬀerent rates of learning.
Succar (1987) and Young (1991) examine the impact of learning spillovers across industries. Krug-
man (1987) further extends the multi-industry model by allowing for learning in both the home
and foreign industries. This last treatment departs from the assumption that a particular country
is less developed than its trading partners and rather focuses on the study of the pattern of trade
when comparative advantage is dynamic. His model does relate to infant industry protection, as
he describes how a country can expand the set of industries in which it has a static comparative
advantage through the use of trade policies. Redding (1999) incorporates welfare analysis in this
type of model and explicitly shows how protection can enhance welfare through such a mechanism.
This paper returns to Bardhan￿s (1971) single industry framework but relaxes the assumption
that the domestic and foreign goods are perfect substitutes ￿ introducing Armington product dif-
ferentiation. Consumers thus derive some bene￿t from consuming both the domestic and foreign
variety. This paper further extends his work by considering several diﬀerent types of trade instru-
ments when these are not perfectly ￿exible over time (Bardhan (1971) only considers the use of
￿exible production subsidies). Learning is assumed to be bounded, thereby eliminating any motive
for permanent protection. Although temporary protection may be warranted, this will not always
be the welfare maximizing policy as I explicitly consider cases where the Mill-Bastable Test is not
passed; I then show how the characteristics of the industry in￿uence the ful￿llment of this test.5
5Head (1994) and Irwin (2000) use a similar theoretical structure to empirically measure the cumulative costs and
bene￿ts of two particular instances of infant industry protection.
33 The Model
Learning and Production
The domestic and foreign goods are homogeneous, and produced by competitive ￿rms in both
countries. The technologies used by all ￿rms exhibit static constant returns to scale. However,
the domestic industry is in its ￿infant￿ phase where its marginal cost at time t, ct, decreases
with cumulative production Qt =
R t
0 qsds as the industry is learning-by-doing. Time is continuous
and qt represents represents total domestic production at time t. Learning is bounded, and the
domestic industry becomes mature after a threshold level of cumulative production ﬂ Q is attained.
The marginal production cost then no longer varies with cumulative production and remains at its
long-run level ﬂ c. Speci￿cally, learning is characterized by a function ct = c(Qt) with the following
properties: 
   
   
c(Q0)=c0 > ﬂ c (Q0 =0 ),
c0(Qt) < 0 ∀Qt < ﬂ Q,
c(Qt)=ﬂ c ∀Qt ≥ ﬂ Q.
This learning function is assumed to be diﬀerentiable everywhere, though its shape is not further
restricted. The foreign technology has matured at a marginal cost level ￿ c, which remains constant
over time.6 The relative levels of the long run costs ﬂ c and ￿ c are left unrestricted. The learning
externality arises from the competitive nature of the industry and the technological spillovers:
domestic ￿rms assume that the eﬀect of their own production on industry output is negligible and
thus do not internalize the future cost-reducing eﬀects of their current production. Each ￿rm thus
myopically values its output at its current marginal cost ct.
In order to simplify the ensuing analysis, a rather extreme form of spillovers and externality has
been assumed: spillovers between domestic ￿rms are complete,7 whereas international spillovers
are non-existent; ￿rms then do not internalize any of the future bene￿ts of their current produc-
tion. These assumptions are intended as a simpli￿cation of an environment where intra-national
spillovers dominate international ones8 and ￿rms do not fully internalize the bene￿ts of their current
production on future costs.
6Throughout this paper, tildes (￿) will be used to denote foreign variables.
7See Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988) for a discussion of the eﬀects of incomplete versus complete spillovers.
8Branstetter (2001) ￿nds very strong support for this assumption based on spillovers within and between U.S. and
Japanese ￿rms.
4Domestic Demand
Domestic demand is generated by a representative consumer whose instantaneous utility function is
additively separable in a numeraire good. The instantaneous utility gained from the aggregate con-
sumption of the domestic (q) and foreign (￿ q) goods is represented by a strictly concave utility func-
tion U(q, ￿ q). Let Uq (q, ￿ q) and U￿ q (q, ￿ q) denote the ￿rst derivatives and Uqq (q, ￿ q),U￿ q￿ q (q, ￿ q),U q￿ q (q, ￿ q)
denote the second and cross-partial derivatives of this utility function.9 In order to make the analy-
sis of the Mill-Bastable Test relevant, domestic consumers should be able to forego consumption
of the domestic good in favor of the sole consumption of the foreign variety. The marginal util-
ity of the domestic good, Uq (q, ￿ q), is therefore assumed to admit a ￿nite upper bound.10 Given
prices p and ￿ p, the representative consumer chooses quantities q and ￿ q that maximize consumer
surplus CS = U(q, ￿ q)−pq−￿ p￿ q. This yields a demand system [q(p, ￿ p), ￿ q(p, ￿ p)] where ∂q(p, ￿ p)/∂p and
∂￿ q(p, ￿ p)/∂￿ p are negative (by concavity of U(q, ￿ q))a n d∂q(p, ￿ p)/∂￿ p and ∂￿ q(p, ￿ p)/∂p are non-negative
(since the two goods are substitutes).
The assumption of bounded marginal utility for q further implies the existence of ￿choke￿ prices
beyond which demand for the domestic good is driven to zero: given any foreign price ￿ p,t h e r ee x i s t s
a choke price p0 for the domestic good such that q(p, ￿ p)=0for all p ≥ p0. Since the two goods
are substitutes, this choke price p0 must be a non-decreasing function of ￿ p. Whenever demand for
the domestic good is zero, demand for the foreign good will be uniquely determined by its price ￿ p.
Let ﬂ q = q(ﬂ c,￿ c) and ﬂ ￿ q =￿ q(ﬂ c,￿ c) denote the long run demand levels under free trade (after learning
is complete). Both demand levels are assumed positive. On the other hand, the initial demand for
the domestic good under free trade, q0 = q(c0,￿ c), could be zero. Without any policy intervention,
domestic production would then not occur and only the foreign variety would be consumed. Let
￿ q0 =￿ q(c0,￿ c) denote this constant foreign demand level.
In order to simplify some of the ensuing analysis pertaining to tariﬀs and quotas (where the
exact form of substitution between the domestic and foreign goods becomes relevant), this paper
will use a simple linear parametrization of the demand system. This demand structure is gen-
erated by a symmetric quadratic utility function U(q, ￿ q) with constant second and cross-partial
derivatives.11 β ≡− Uqq(q, ￿ q)=−U￿ q￿ q(q, ￿ q) > 0 then indexes the slope of the demand curves while
9Uq￿ q (q, ￿ q) ≤ 0 since the goods are substitutes.
10The marginal utility of the foreign good may also be bounded, although this will not be relevant for the analysis.
11Symmetry is only introduced in order to nest perfect substitution between the goods as a special limiting case.
Note that the symmetry of U(.,.) still allows for quality diﬀerences between the goods through speci￿cation of their
quantity units (and possibly their costs).
5η ≡− Uq￿ q(q, ￿ q)/β ∈ [0,1] captures the substitutability (or inverse level of product diﬀerentiation)
between the two goods. Product substitutability increases with η from zero (the demand for the
two goods are unrelated) to one (the goods are perfect substitutes).
Domestic Welfare and Policies
A government planner may use domestic production subsidies, tariﬀs, or quotas to ￿protect￿ the
domestic infant industry. The usage of these instruments may potentially be restricted (as will be
described in more detail later). Exports by the domestic industry in its infant phase are assumed
to be negligible.12 At any time t, a quota is equivalent to a particular tariﬀ level (for now the
quota rights are assumed to be auctioned and collected by the government). Given the competitive
market structure, a time t subsidy σt and tariﬀ τt aﬀect domestic prices in the following way:
pt = ct − σt, ￿ pt =￿ c + τt. Since learning is only modeled in its reduced form, as incorporated in
cumulative production, I only consider trade policies that directly aﬀect the production level of the
￿rms. As pointed out by Baldwin (1969), trade policies directed at the source of the externality
(knowledge creation and dissemination) should be considered. This would involve a more structural
approach to the learning process and is beyond the scope of this paper.
The policy choices lead to domestic demand levels qt = q(pt, ￿ pt) and ￿ qt =￿ q(pt, ￿ pt),a n dd o m e s t i c
welfare Wt = CSt − σtqt − τt￿ qt = U(qt, ￿ qt) − ctqt − ￿ c￿ qt. The government planner is benevolent and
chooses policies to maximize the discounted sum of welfare ￿ows over a given period of time T that
always includes the entire learning phase (so long as domestic production occurs).13 As pointed out
by Dixit (Supplement 1984), the planner￿s choice of instruments can be re-interpreted as a choice of
consumption quantities from a feasible set generated by the consumer￿s demand. Any restrictions
on trade instruments would then be transformed into additional restrictions on the set of feasible
consumption pairs. The planner￿s problem can thus be written as:
max
(qt,￿ qt)∈Ft
TW =
Z T
0
e−ρtWtdt =
Z T
0
e−ρt [U (qt, ￿ qt) − ctqt − ￿ c￿ qt]dt, (1)
where Ft ⊆ <2
+ is the set of feasible quantity pairs at time t and ρ is the exogenous discount
rate. The planning period of length T is used instead of an in￿nite horizon in order to allow for
the simpli￿cation of negligible discounting (ρ =0 )during the learning phase. Since these learning
12This precludes the use of export subsidies to accelerate the learning process.
13The planner may also care about domestic welfare after time T, though the optimal policies at that time must
be free trade (no protection).
6phases are reasonably short (on the order of years, not decades) the formal modeling of low discount
factors is fairly inconsequential. In order to avoid uninteresting case, the chosen policies are assumed
to always lead to positive demand for the foreign good. However, the possibility of zero demand
for the domestic good (when initial costs are high) will lead to some interesting scenarios that will
be explicitly analyzed.
No Intervention Benchmark
When no policy instruments are used, two general cases will arise: i) If the initial domestic cost
c0 is high enough to preclude demand for the domestic good under free trade (q(c0,￿ c)=0 ), then
the domestic industry will not ￿survive￿ (there will be no domestic production) ￿ regardless of its
learning potential. Consumers solely rely on imports ￿ q0 =￿ q(c0,￿ c) of the foreign variety. ii) If c0
is low enough (q(c0,￿ c) > 0), then domestic production occurs and increases over time as learning
progresses. Imports of the foreign variety ￿ qt simultaneously decrease during this phase. Demand
levels stabilize at their long run levels ﬂ q and ﬂ ￿ q after learning ceases.
4 Flexible Trade Policies
In this section, I assume that the government planner can choose any time paths for the subsidies
and tariﬀs over the planning horizon from t =0to t = T. This assumption de￿nes the set Ft of
possible output pairs (qt, ￿ qt). The social planner thus solves the maximization problem (1) subject
to the conditions ct = c(Qt), qt = œ Qt (no exports of the domestic good) and the initial boundary
condition Q0 =0(QT is left unrestricted). Let H be the current value Hamiltonian associated with
this problem:
H(qt, ￿ qt,Q t)=U(qt, ￿ qt) − c(Qt)qt − ￿ c￿ qt + λtqt,
where λt ≥ 0 is the current value shadow price of a unit of cumulative production.
7Interior Solution: Positive Domestic Production Levels
Assuming qt > 0 and ￿ qt > 0,t h e￿rst order conditions for the planner￿s problem are given by:
∂H
∂qt
= Uq (qt, ￿ qt) − c(Qt)+λt =0 , (2)
∂H
∂￿ qt
= U￿ q (qf, ￿ qt) − ￿ c =0 , (3)
∂H
∂Qt
= −c0(Qt)qt = ρλt − œ λt. (4)
Since QT is left unrestricted, the transversality condition yields λT =0 . Conditions (2) and (3)
imply τt =0and σt = λt: along the optimal interior path, no tariﬀs should be used and the subsidy
in any period should be equal to the current value of a unit of learning.
Condition (4) gives an equation of motion for domestic output. Using (2) and (3), ￿ qt, λt,a n d
œ λt can be written as functions of Qt, qt,a n dœ qt, yielding a second order diﬀerential equation for
Qt. Integrating (4) yields an expression for the optimal subsidy as a function of current and future
domestic costs:
σt = ct − e−ρ(T−t)cT − ρ
Z T
t
e−ρ(s−t)csds. (5)
Learning ceases at some (endogenously determined) point ﬂ t during the planning period; thereafter,
ct is constant at ﬂ c. Since future costs cs will be bounded between current costs and the long run
cost (ﬂ c ≤ cs ≤ ct), (5) can be used to obtain bounds on the optimal subsidy and domestic price:
e−ρ(ﬂ t−t) (ct − ﬂ c) ≤ λt ≤ ct − ﬂ c,
ﬂ c ≤ pt ≤ e−ρ(ﬂ t−t)ﬂ c +
‡
1 − e−ρ(ﬂ t−t)
·
ct.
As long as there is learning potential (ct > ﬂ c), positive subsidies should be used although they
should never be greater than the current learning potential measured as the diﬀerence between
current and long run costs ct − ﬂ c. Of course, subsidies should cease with learning at ﬂ t. The upper
bound on the current price pt is a weighted average of the current and long run costs ct and ﬂ c.
Given a reasonable discount factor and learning period length, the weight on ﬂ c will dominate that
on ct.14 When the discount rate is negligible (ρ =0 ), t h ed o m e s t i cp r i c ept should remain constant
at ﬂ c, which is then the constant social marginal cost of a unit of domestic production. Subsidies
14A discount factor under 4% and learning period of up to 5 years lead to a weight on ﬂ c that is more than 4 times
higher than the weight on ct.
8at any time t are then given by the learning potential ct − ﬂ c. These subsidies decrease over time,
regardless of the shape of the learning curve. Under these scenarios, domestic output and foreign
imports remain constant at their long run free trade levels ﬂ q and ﬂ ￿ q. Given the ￿exibility of the
trade instruments, the feasibility of these consumptions paths is guaranteed.
Corner Solution: No Domestic Production
If domestic production is zero at any point along the optimal path, then it must be zero over the
entire optimal path.15 Given this, the ￿rst order conditions for the planner￿s problem only require
that the marginal utility of the foreign good be equated to its cost (again, no tariﬀ should be used)
and that the shadow value of cumulative production be zero: no subsidies are then used. This
scenario is feasible only when no intervention leads to zero demand for the domestic good. Initial
costs c0 must be high enough that q(c0,￿ c)=0 . Otherwise, domestic production would be positive,
and the interior optimal path must be followed.
The Mill-Bastable Test
The previous analysis revealed that, under some conditions on the initial costs, there are two scenar-
ios satisfying the ￿rst order conditions for welfare maximization: production subsidies (satisfying
the interior solution path) and laissez-faire (no domestic industry and reliance on imports). The
social planner must then determine which solution yields higher total welfare. This amounts to
applying the Mill-Bastable Test.
The evaluation of diﬀerent trade policies depends on the comparisons of the welfare ￿ows Wt
induced by the trade policies. Unfortunately, these ￿ows are hard to compare because they are not
only a function of the consumption levels (qt, ￿ qt) but also critically depend on the current level of
domestic cost ct. This section shows how cumulative total welfare TW can be decomposed into
a sum of welfare ￿ows that do not depend on the changing current domestic cost and a separate
￿xed learning cost. For simplicity, the following derivations assume that the eﬀects of discounting
are negligible.16 Given this assumption, any pair of consumption paths (qt, ￿ qt) that induce learning
15When the domestic good is consumed, its consumption path must be non-decreasing. Thus, if consumption of
the domestic good is positive at any time t,i tm u s ta l s ob ep o s i t i v ea ta n yt i m ea f t e rt.F u r t h e r m o r e ,i tc a nn o tb e
optimal to start domestic production at time t>0 since the same consumption path pushed back to start at t =0
would yield higher welfare.
16The formal modeling of a small discount rate does not qualitatively change any of the results. A separate
appendix describes in more detail how discounting will aﬀect the following analysis. Brie￿y, the discount rate should
be small enough such that the eﬀects of discounting during the learning period are dominated by the learning eﬀects.
The eﬀects of discounting after learning has occurred may be signi￿cant if the planning period extends signi￿cantly
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Figure 1: The Learning Curve and the Fixed Learning Cost
before the end of the planning period (QT ≥ ﬂ Q), yield a total welfare measure that can be written:
TW =
Z T
0
Wtdt =
Z T
0
[U(qt, ￿ qt) − c(Qt)qt − ￿ c￿ qt]dt
=
Z T
0
[U(qt, ￿ qt) − ﬂ cqt − ￿ c￿ qt]dt −
Z T
0
[c(Qt) − ﬂ c)qt]dt
=
Z T
0
[U(qt, ￿ qt) − ﬂ cqt − ￿ c￿ qt]dt −
Z ﬂ Q
0
[c(Qt) − ﬂ c]dt.
De￿ne a new welfare ￿ow function ﬂ w(qt, ￿ qt)=U(qt, ￿ qt)−ﬂ cqt−￿ c￿ qt, which is the welfare ￿ow assuming
that the current domestic cost is constant at ﬂ c instead of ct. Further de￿ne the ￿xed learning cost
FLC as
R ﬂ Q
0 ([c(Q) − ﬂ c]dQ.T h i sc o s ti s￿xed because it does not depend on the chosen consumption
paths but only on the learning function: it is the area below the learning curve above the lowest
potential cost line at ﬂ c.G i v e nﬂ Q, and cost bounds c0 and ﬂ c, FLC will be determined by the ￿speed￿
of learning as shown in Figure 1.
Total welfare TW can thus be written:
TW =
Z T
0
ﬂ w(qt, ￿ qt)dt − FLC. (6)
Regardless of the chosen consumption paths (qt, ￿ qt), the total welfare generated by these paths dur-
past the learning phase. The appendix shows how these eﬀe c t sc a nb ei n c l u d e di nt h ea n a l y s i sw i t h o u ta ﬀecting the
results.
10ing the planning period can be evaluated by using the static welfare ￿ows ﬂ w(qt, ￿ qt) and subtracting
the same ￿xed cost FLC. This re-formulation allows a straightforward comparison of diﬀerent
trade policy scenarios: if the domestic industry does not produce, then the welfare ￿ows are con-
stant at W0 = U(0, ￿ q0) − ￿ c￿ q0 =ﬂ w
¡
0, ￿ q0¢
and no ￿xed learning cost is incurred.17 If the domestic
industry produces, then the same welfare function ﬂ w(qt, ￿ qt) is used to evaluate the welfare ￿ows and
the ￿xed learning cost is subtracted. Given that learning occurs, the optimal trade policy ignores
the learning cost and only seeks to maximize the cumulative welfare ￿ows ﬂ w(qt, ￿ qt). This helps to
explain the optimal subsidy path that was previously derived under the assumption of negligible
discounting: since ﬂ w(.,.) is concave and attains its global maximum at (ﬂ q, ﬂ ￿ q), the highest possible
welfare ￿ow is generated by keeping qt and ￿ qt constant at their long-run levels ﬂ q and ﬂ ￿ q.T h e s ew e r e
precisely the optimal consumption paths induced by the optimal subsidies.
Let W =ﬂ w(ﬂ q, ﬂ ￿ q) be the maximum value of the welfare ￿ow function ﬂ w(.,.). The determination
of the Mill-Bastable Test ￿ that is, between subsidization and no protection (and no domestic
industry) ￿ thus depends on the weighing of the higher welfare ￿ows W ≥ W0 (the bene￿ts of
learning) against the ￿xed learning cost FLC. As the length of the planning horizon is extended,
the subsidization alternative clearly becomes more attractive, because the bene￿ts of the post-
learning higher welfare are enjoyed over a longer time period. More interestingly, a low potential
cost ﬂ c does not automatically entail that subsidization is optimal: the low ﬂ c can be oﬀset by a high
initial cost co or a slow learning curve, which both increase the subsidization cost FLC without
aﬀecting the diﬀerence between the welfare ￿ows W and W0. There will always exist a level of
initial cost co high enough and learning pace slow enough such that no subsidization is optimal
even with arbitrarily low potential cost ﬂ c.
The degree of substitutability between the two goods also aﬀects the relative merits of subsi-
dization. In order to vary the degree of substitutability while ensuring positive demand for both
goods under optimal subsidization, I assume that ﬂ c =￿ c (this is also a reasonable assumption that
a common technology and factor price equalization will prevail in the long run and equalize costs).
Then, as the products become closer substitutes, the diﬀerence between W and W0 decreases and
goes to zero as the goods become perfect substitutes. On the other hand, the learning cost FLC
does not change with the degree of substitutability. Assuming that subsidization is optimal if the
goods are unrelated, the relative advantage of subsidization will then decrease with the level of
product diﬀerentiation until the subsidization scenario is no longer optimal. Clearly, subsidization
17Recall that ￿ q
0 =￿ q(p,￿ c) whenever q(p,￿ c)=0 .
11will never be optimal when the goods are close enough substitutes, as the learning cost FLC will
always outweigh the small welfare advantage W −W0.18 Interestingly, the degree of substitutability
critically aﬀects the ful￿llment of the Mill-Bastable Test but has no eﬀect on the optimal path of
the subsidies, given that protection is optimal.
5 Second Best Intervention: Subsidization no longer possible
Given budgetary or political constraints, subsidies may become infeasible, leaving only tariﬀso r
quotas as available instruments.19 T h el e v e lo ft h et a r i ﬀ is still assumed (in this section) to be
￿exible over time. Tariﬀs and quotas therefore retain their equivalence. In the previous section, it
was previously shown that production subsidies can raise welfare by raising production levels of the
domestic good above their free-market levels. Tariﬀs obviously share some substitutability as policy
instruments with the now unavailable subsidies since they can also raise domestic production levels.
On the other hand, it is well known that tariﬀs also induce an extra distortion on the consumption
side, creating a wedge between the marginal cost of the foreign good and its marginal bene￿t.
T h es o c i a lp l a n n e rm u s tn o wt r a d eo ﬀ the bene￿ts of higher domestic production against this new
distortion. Further note that a very high initial cost c0 may render tariﬀs useless as demand for
the domestic good could still be zero in autarky (given arbitrarily high levels of tariﬀs).
Interior Solution: Positive Domestic Production Levels
The planner￿s maximization problem is still described by (1), but the set of feasible consumption
pairs Ft is now restricted due to the infeasibility of subsidies. This restriction imposes marginal
cost pricing of the domestic good, or Uq(qt, ￿ qt)=c(Qt), so long as positive quantities of the good
are demanded. The consumption path of the foreign good is thus completely determined by the
consumption path of the domestic good. The current value Hamiltonian H can be re-written as a
function of only the domestic production level:
H(qt,Q t)=U(qt, ￿ qt) − c(Qt)qt − ￿ c￿ qt + µtqt,
18This still assumes that ﬂ c =￿ c.I fﬂ c is signi￿cantly below ￿ c, then subsidization may be optimal even when the two
goods are perfect substitutes.
19Some of these constraints could also potentially alter the welfare function. This possibility is not considered in
this paper.
12where ￿ qt is implicitly de￿ned as a function of qt and Qt by Uq(qt, ￿ qt)=c(Qt) and µt is the new
shadow price of cumulative domestic production. The new ￿rst order conditions are:
∂H
∂qt
= Uq(qt, ￿ qt) − c(Qt)+µt + U￿ q(qt, ￿ qt)
∂￿ qt
∂qt
− ￿ c
∂￿ qt
∂qt
=0 ,
∂H
∂Qt
= −c0(Qt)qt + U￿ q(qt, ￿ qt)
∂￿ qt
∂Qt
− ￿ c
∂￿ qt
∂Qt
= ρµt − œ µt,
which can be re-written as
τt =
Uq￿ q(qt, ￿ qt)
Uqq(qt, ￿ qt)
µt, (7)
−c0(Qt)qt +
c0(Qt)
Uqq(qt, ￿ qt)
µt = ρµt − œ µt. (8)
(7) shows that tariﬀs do share some substitutability with the now unavailable subsidies and should
be used to boost domestic production levels ￿ so long as learning is not complete (µt > 0) and the
goods exhibit some substitutability (Uq￿ q (q, ￿ q) 6=0 ). The equation of motion (8) now depends on the
exact form of the substitution pattern between the goods. Therefore, in order to gain more insight
on the optimal dynamic path of the tariﬀ, the previously introduced demand parametrization is
assumed. Recall that this linear demand system is characterized by two key parameters: β, the
slope of the demand curves, and η ∈ [0,1], the index of product substitutability. For additional
simplicity, the assumption of negligible discounting is re-introduced.
Conditions (7) and (8) then yield:
τt = ηµt
= η (ct − ﬂ c)+
Z ﬂ t
t
−c0(Qt)
β
τsds, (9)
where ﬂ t is the endogenously determined time at which learning ceases. Naturally, the optimal tariﬀs
depend on the level of product diﬀerentiation. Given the value of a unit of cumulative learning
µt (which is bounded below by the learning potential ct − ﬂ c), the optimal tariﬀ response decreases
with the level of product diﬀerentiation: tariﬀs are then increasingly ineﬀective tools for raising
domestic production levels. (9) shows that, similarly to the case of subsidies, tariﬀ protection
should decrease as learning progresses and cease with learning when ct reaches ﬂ c. However, this
optimal path for protection may not always be feasible: when the initial cost c0 is high, the optimal
path for domestic output could be infeasible as tariﬀs become ineﬀective once imports are driven
13to zero. In this case, tariﬀ protection can not ￿save￿ the domestic industry. Reliance on imports
under free trade must be the constrained (since subsidies are infeasible) welfare maximizing policy.
The Mill-Bastable Test
Free trade (no tariﬀ protection) may also be the welfare maximizing policy in situations where
protection could have been applied and led to the survival (and maturing) of the domestic industry
(∃τ,q(c0,￿ c + τ) > 0). This situation arises only when the domestic industry would not survive
under free trade (q(c0,￿ c)=0 ).20 As was the case with subsidies, the planner is then faced with a
choice between protection (leading to the survival of the domestic industry) and laissez-faire (free
trade and exclusive reliance on imports): the Mill-Bastable Test must be applied.
Assuming negligible discounting, the decomposition of total welfare under protection remains
as in (6). The costs of protection, namely the ￿xed learning cost FLC, are thus identical to the
case when subsidies were feasible. The benchmark welfare ￿ows W0 =ﬂ w(0, ￿ q0) under no protection
are also the same. The only diﬀerence involves the bene￿ts of protection captured by the welfare
￿ows ﬂ w(qt, ￿ qt) during the planning period. Contrary to the case of subsidy protection, the global
maximum of ﬂ w(.,.) at W =ﬂ w(ﬂ q, ﬂ ￿ q) can not be reached until the domestic cost has reached its
lower bound ﬂ c. This welfare diﬀerence re￿ects the additional consumption distortion introduced by
tariﬀ protection: production levels of the domestic good can only be raised via the distortion of the
consumption decision for the foreign good. The optimal tariﬀ path (9) is then chosen to maximize
the cumulative welfare ￿ows
R T
0 ﬂ w(qt, ￿ qt)dt (since FLC is independent of the chosen output paths).
Given any domestic cost ct, ﬂ w(qt, ￿ qt) will be maximized at a tariﬀ level τ = η(ct − ﬂ c), and the
diﬀerence between this maximized welfare level and W will decrease to zero as ct decreases to ﬂ c
(see appendix for proof). The optimal tariﬀ (when positive) is therefore always above this level
(as indicated by (9)) as it trades-oﬀ the per-period maximum of ﬂ w(qt, ￿ qt) with the dynamic eﬀects
of higher current production, which allow future welfare ￿ows to attain levels even closer to their
maximum W (through the eﬀect on lower future costs).
The diﬀerence between the higher total bene￿ts under subsidy protection
¡
T • W
¢
and tariﬀ
protection is therefore a function of the speed of learning and the ability of tariﬀst or a i s ed o m e s t i c
production levels. This has two important consequences for the Mill-Bastable Test under tariﬀ
protection: i) the Mill-Bastable Test will fail (protection is not optimal) in cases where protection
20This is the only situation where both the optimal interior tariﬀ path and free trade (no protection) satisfy the
￿rst order conditions for welfare maximization.
14via subsidies would satisfy the test. ii) The level of product diﬀerentiation now has an ambiguous
eﬀect on the result of the test. In contrast to the case of subsidies, higher levels of product
diﬀerentiation no longer unambiguously make protection more appealing: they raise the potential
bene￿ts of a mature domestic industry but simultaneously render tariﬀ protection less eﬀective in
boosting domestic production levels.
6F i x e d T a r i ﬀsa n dQ u o t a s
In this section, I continue to assume that subsidization is infeasible. I further assume, due either to
political constraints or to adjustment costs, that changing the level of a tariﬀ or quota over time is
costly. I initially assume that these costs are high enough that the social planner is constrained to
pick only one tariﬀ or quota level for the entire planning period.21 Although a quota is equivalent
to a particular tariﬀ level at any point in time, the value of this tariﬀ level changes over time when
t h ev a l u eo ft h eq u o t ar e m a i n s￿xed. A ￿xed quota and ￿xed tariﬀ thus clearly have diﬀerent
dynamic properties, though both cases are subsumed in the previous section dealing with ￿exible
tariﬀs.
Given these added restrictions on the use of trade instruments, the social planner must choose
a trade instrument (quota or tariﬀ), as well as determine its optimal level. Since this level remains
￿xed, these two choices completely determine the consumption paths throughout the entire planning
period. The set of feasible consumption pairs Ft is thus reduced to a set of trajectories indexed by
the choice of instrument and its level. Of course, the social planner can also choose not to protect
the infant industry. In this case, the domestic industry would still produce (and learning would
occur) if the initial cost were low enough (q(c0,￿ c) > 0). I initially assume this to be the case in
order to eliminate the possibility of no domestic production and learning. No protection is then
nested as a special case of a ￿xed tariﬀ at zero (or high ￿xed quota level).
T h ep r e v i o u sa n a l y s i so ft h eo p t i m a l￿exible tariﬀ highlights the intuition for the advantages
of the quota over the tariﬀ when their ￿exibility is restricted. A natural choice of quota level is
the long run consumption level for the foreign good ﬂ ￿ q.T h i s￿xed quota generates a path over time
for the equivalent tariﬀ path that decreases throughout the learning period and remains at zero
right after learning ceases: this is a good ￿rst approximation to the optimal ￿exible tariﬀ path.
21This assumption on the large size of the adjustment cost is initially used for simplicity and will subsequently be
relaxed. The qualitative results rely only on the presence of some non-negligible adjustment cost. The possibility of
indexing the tariﬀ to the current cost conditions is addressed in a later section.
15On the other hand, the problems with a ￿xed tariﬀ are also clear: any ￿xed tariﬀ either does not
oﬀer enough protection early in the learning phase, or protects too much towards the end of the
learning phase. In fact, any positive ￿xed tariﬀ necessarily protects too much after learning ceases
when no protection is optimal. This tariﬀ then induces consumption distortions from that point
on, until the end of the planning period. These motivations for the superiority of the quota remain
valid when discounting is introduced and for any type of utility function. However, for expositional
simplicity, I maintain the assumptions of negligible discounting and linear demands ￿ and show
how a ￿xed quota then always dominates a ￿xed tariﬀ.
Given that the domestic industry produces and learning occurs, the same ￿xed learning cost will
be incurred and any two scenarios can be evaluated by comparing the accumulated welfare ￿ows
R T
0 ﬂ w(qt, ￿ qt)dt generated by each scenario. I ￿rst show that a ￿xed quota at ﬂ ￿ q is indeed a reasonable
choice: the welfare ￿ows accumulated under this policy are higher at every point in time than
those accumulated under any small ￿xed tariﬀ (including the case of free trade). Although this
comparison is not possible for some larger tariﬀs (this categorization of tariﬀ size will be made
explicit momentarily), it is then shown that the welfare ￿ows under such a tariﬀ are nevertheless
dominated by a diﬀerent ￿xed quota that is more restrictive than ﬂ ￿ q. The relative merits of this
quota relative to ﬂ ￿ q remain ambiguous. Nevertheless, the existence of a ￿xed quota that dominates
any ￿xed tariﬀ is guaranteed.
At a r i ﬀ is labeled as small if it induces a learning period that is longer (or equal to) the learning
period induced by the ￿xed quota at ﬂ ￿ q. This de￿nes an upper bound tariﬀ level. Any ￿xed tariﬀ
below this level generates welfare ￿ows ﬂ w(qt, ￿ qt) below those generated by the quota for the following
reasons: given a domestic cost ct,t h et a r i ﬀ that maximizes ﬂ w(qt, ￿ qt),η(ct − ﬂ c), is precisely the tariﬀ
level induced by the quota at ﬂ ￿ q (see appendix for proof). The welfare ￿ow under the small tariﬀ
will be even further below this maximized level as the domestic cost will be above (or equal to) the
cost under the quota at any point during the planning period.22
The preceding reasoning did not exclude the possibility of a high ￿xed tariﬀ generating welfare
￿ows above those generated by the quota at ﬂ ￿ q in situations where the domestic cost under the tariﬀ
is signi￿cantly below the cost under the quota. Such a high ￿xed tariﬀ would unlikely generate
higher total welfare over the entire planning period since it would also entail very high levels of
22Consider the ￿xed tariﬀ that induces the same learning period length as the quota set at ﬂ ￿ q: Qt reaches ﬂ Q at the
same time under both scenarios. The equivalent tariﬀ generated by the quota must be above the ￿xed tariﬀ level
early on, and below it later on. This implies that cumulative production under the quota will be higher ￿ and hence
costs will be lower ￿ at any given time. Any lower tariﬀ will then generate even lower cumulative production levels
and hence induce even higher costs.
16distortion later in the learning phase until the end of the planning period. However, in this unusual
case, the high ￿xed tariﬀ would still be dominated by a more restrictive ￿xed quota set below ﬂ ￿ q.
In the appendix, it is shown that a ￿xed quota that generates a learning phase equal in length to
that of an arbitrary ￿xed tariﬀ always yields higher total welfare (both during the learning phase
and after) than the tariﬀ.23
Small Adjustment Costs
As the exogenous adjustment costs decrease, the social planner can consider changing the level
of the trade instrument (tariﬀ or quota) during the planning period. The latter would then be
partitioned into smaller periods within which the trade instrument would be ￿xed. The number
of partitions would increase as the adjus t m e n tc o s t sf a l l . I nt h ec a s eo fat a r i ﬀ,t h e￿xed tariﬀ
levels over each successive partition would decrease. The last partition would have a zero tariﬀ
and extend from the end of the learning phase to the end of the planning period. The number and
timing of partitions along with their associated tariﬀ levels would be endogenously determined by
the planner as a function of the adjustment costs. In the limit, as the adjustment costs drop to
zero, the time path of the optimal tariﬀ will coincide with the optimal ￿exible tariﬀ path that was
previously derived.
In order to evaluate the choice of trade policy instruments, I assume that the adjustment costs
depend only on the number of times the level of the trade instrument is changed. If the chosen
trade instrument is a quota, then the optimal policy will similarly involve a partition of the planning
period into segments with ￿xed quota levels. Although the number and timing of the partitions will
be diﬀerent than those chosen under the tariﬀs, it is nevertheless possible to compare total welfare
levels under the two types of trade instruments. The quotas continue to dominate the tariﬀs, again
yielding higher total welfare outcomes.
This dominance is driven by a simple consideration: given any individual partition of the
planning period and any ￿xed tariﬀ level within that partition, a ￿xed quota that generates the
same amount of cumulative production as the tariﬀ during this same partition must also yield
higher total welfare over this period.24 Thus, the outcome of the optimal tariﬀ policy can be
easily compared to a quota policy that uses the same partitions and induces the same amount
23This is a special case of the proof used for the following section when welfare is evaluated over a subset of the
learning phase. Welfare under the quota must be higher after learning ceases since the quota then generates an
equivalent tariﬀ that is lower than the ￿xed tariﬀ level.
24See the appendix for a proof.
17of cumulative domestic production over each separate partition (the ￿xed quota levels over each
partition are set in order to maintain this equality). This quota policy clearly dominates the optimal
tariﬀ policy as it yields higher total welfare in every partition while incurring the same amount of
adjustment costs.25 The optimal quota policy will yield even further gains as the planner optimally
chooses the number and timing of partitions for the quota.
The Mill-Bastable Test
When evaluating cases where the initial cost is high enough to preclude demand for the domestic
good under free trade, then the option of no protection (and thus no domestic production) is
potentially optimal. Once again, the social planner needs to trade-oﬀ the welfare ￿ow bene￿ts of
protection against the ￿xed learning cost. These trade-oﬀs are similar to the case of the ￿exible
tariﬀ,e x c e p tt h a tt h ew e l f a r e￿ow bene￿ts will be lower as they are additionally constrained by the
adjustment costs.
7 Additional Advantages of the Quota
When the high initial domestic cost precludes demand for the domestic good under no protection
and the planning period extends signi￿cantly past the end of the learning phase, then the choice
of protection with the ￿xed quota at ﬂ ￿ q is clearly preferred to no protection: the ￿xed learning cost
can be repaid, not only by higher welfare ￿ows during the learning phase, but also by the welfare
￿ows at the unrestricted maximum of W which accrue from the end of the learning phase until
the end of the planning period. If the adjustment costs are also high and preclude changing the
level of the trade instrument, then the ￿xed tariﬀ oﬀers a terrible alternative to the ￿xed quota: in
order to induce initial production of the domestic good, the tariﬀ must be set at a very high level
comparable to the level of the initial equivalent tariﬀ associated with the quota. Once learning
progresses, this high tariﬀ creates ever increasing distortions. When learning ceases, this high
level of distortion (which generates a welfare ￿ow far below W) is maintained until the end of the
planning period. This considerable diﬀerence between the welfare bene￿ts of the quota and tariﬀ
could potentially outweigh any amount of revenue loss related to the administration of a quota.
Thus, even a voluntary export restraint (assuming that the domestic country￿s transfer of revenue
to foreign suppliers is not politically necessary to enact the restraint) could yield higher welfare
25The domestic cost at the beginning and end of every partition will be the same under both policies since the
same amount of cumulative production occurs over each partition.
18gains to the domestic country than any ￿xed tariﬀ alternative.
Although a ￿xed subsidy instrument is not formally modeled in this paper, it is also clearly
possible for the ￿xed quota to yield higher welfare gains than an optimally chosen ￿xed subsidy.
Even though the subsidy does not generate any consumption distortions for the foreign good (as
do the quota and tariﬀ), the rigidity of the subsidy nevertheless creates the same type of problems
mentioned for the tariﬀ:a￿xed subsidy either does not protect the infant industry enough early
in the learning phase, or it protects it too much later on.
Finally, the ￿xed quota exhibits one other advantage to policy makers over both the tariﬀsa n d
subsidies, even when these are ￿exible: a lower information requirement for implementation. In
order to calculate the long run consumption level of the foreign good ﬂ ￿ q (and hence the optimal
￿xed quota), a policy maker only needs information on the foreign cost, the lower bound domestic
cost, and demand conditions. In particular, no information on the shape of the learning curve
(including its duration) is required. On the other hand, the setting of the optimal subsidies (when
feasible) or tariﬀs, even when these instruments are ￿exible, requires detailed information on this
learning curve. The learning curve may be known to ￿rms and not the policy maker, in which case
the ￿rms would have strong incentives to distort any current and future cost information collected
by the government.26 Furthermore, the learning curve may also have a stochastic element that is
also unknown to ￿rms. Although not formally modeled in this paper, the presence of such learning
curve uncertainty can only reduce the eﬀectiveness of the optimal subsidies or tariﬀs while it does
not aﬀect the performance of the optimal quota.27
8C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has focused on the practical considerations involved in policy decisions for infant industry
protection. A policy maker ￿rst wants to make sure that a candidate industry only needs temporary
protection and that this protection will generate higher cumulative bene￿ts than costs. The paper
shows how this Mill-Bastable Test can be re-formulated in a way that makes it easier to apply
(when the eﬀects of discounting are negligible): the cumulative costs can be approximated by a
26This problem was studied in Dinopoulos, Lewis and Sappington (1995). Their results show that the presence of
asymmetric learning curve information between ￿rms and the government may preclude protection that would have
been optimal under symmetric information. In general, even asymmetric information about current costs (and not
future costs) may prevent the government from enacting trade policies which would index the tariﬀ or subsidy to the
diﬀerence between current and lower bound cost.
27I am assuming uncertainty about the shape and duration of the learning curve, and not uncertainty about the
lower bound cost, which would aﬀect the design of the optimal quota.
19￿xed learning cost that only depends on the learning curve. If diﬀerent policy instruments meet
the conditions of the Mill-Bastable Test, the policy maker must then choose the optimal policy
instrument for protection. The paper shows how limitations on the instrument￿s ￿exibility over
time strongly aﬀect this choice. Ideally, the policy maker wants to decrease the level of protection
as learning progresses and eliminate protection once learning has ceased. Subsidies or tariﬀs need
to be constantly lowered over time to produce this eﬀect; these adjustments may not be feasible in
practice. A ￿xed quota, on the other hand, automatically reduces its level of protection as domestic
costs fall. The ￿xed quota can also be chosen so as to become non-binding once learning ceases.
These characteristics endow the quota with advantages over the tariﬀ and subsidy. Any uncertainty
concerning the learning curve re-enforces these advantages.
The quota, however, also has some well known drawbacks vis-a-vis the tariﬀ or subsidy. Quo-
tas, even when their rights are auctioned, typically generate less revenue than comparable tariﬀs.
They also, like tariﬀs, distort consumption decisions whereas domestic production subsidies do not.
Finally, binding quotas eliminate some of the market discipline of tariﬀsw h e n￿rms have market
power. This paper does not intend to minimize these drawbacks but rather emphasizes the quota￿s
particular advantages that speci￿cally pertain to infant industry protection. The paper shows how,
in this context, the advantages of the quota (especially over the tariﬀ)a r eq u i t es i g n i ￿cant and
could realistically outweigh these better known disadvantages. This paper does not intend to de-
fend the use of quantity restrictions for infant industry protection as necessarily sound economic
policy. Instead, this paper suggests that the use of some quantity restrictions may be less distort-
ing than previously considered and that, in some speci￿c cases, could have been the outcome of
welfare maximizing behavior by the government. Furthermore, recommendations for future infant
industry policies must also consider the problems that costly policy adjustments and learning curve
uncertainty create for tariﬀs and subsidies. In certain cases, a policy maker will be con￿dent that
the industry￿s cost will drop over time but will be equally con￿dent that any protection policy,
once implemented, will be hard or impossible to repeal. In these cases, a quota will oﬀer an attrac-
tive policy instrument that will ensure that the protection it provides will be temporary and will
decrease in step with the domestic costs.
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22Appendix
Properties of the welfare ￿ow function ﬂ w(qt, ￿ qt)
Let τ∗ (ct) be the tariﬀ level that maximizes the welfare ￿ow ﬂ w(qt, ￿ qt) when subsidies are infeasible.
This tariﬀ is therefore the maximand of ﬂ w[q(ct,￿ c + τ), ￿ q(ct,￿ c + τ)]. The ￿rst order condition for
an interior solution to this problem is
(ct − ﬂ c)
∂q(ct,￿ c + τ)
∂τ
+ τ
∂￿ q(ct,￿ c + τ)
∂τ
=0 .
Under the linear demand structure (where Uq￿ q (q, ￿ q)/U￿ q￿ q (q, ￿ q)=[ ∂q(p, ￿ p)/∂￿ p]/[∂￿ q(p, ￿ p)/∂￿ p]=η),
the welfare maximizing tariﬀ is therefore given by τ∗ (ct)=η(ct − ﬂ c).T h i st a r i ﬀ level, in turn, is
equivalent to a quota set at ﬂ ￿ q since
￿ q[ct,￿ c + η(ct − ﬂ c)] = ￿ q(ﬂ c,￿ c)+ηβ(ct − ﬂ c)+βτ
=￿ q(ﬂ c,￿ c).
By the envelope theorem, the maximized value of ﬂ w(.,.) obtained under the quota at ﬂ ￿ q must increase
as ct decreases, reaching its global maximum at W =ﬂ w(ﬂ q, ﬂ ￿ q) when ct reaches its lower bound ﬂ c.
Comparing Fixed Tariﬀs and Quotas Over Any Partition of the Planning Period
Consider any ￿xed tariﬀ level over any given partition of the planning period extending from t1
to t2. Cumulative production is initially at Q1 at time t1 and increases to Q2 at t2.A s s u m i n g
negligible discounting, total welfare over this partition can be decomposed in the following way:
TW =
Z t2
t1
Wtdt =
Z t2
t1
[U(qt, ￿ qt) − ￿ cqt − ￿ c￿ qt]dt −
Z Q2
Q1
[c(Q) − ￿ c]dQ
=
Z t2
t1
￿ w(qt, ￿ qt)dt − [ FLC,
where ￿ w(qt, ￿ qt)=U(qt, ￿ qt) − ￿ cqt − ￿ c￿ qt and ￿ c is any arbitrary cost level. This decomposition will
be valid for any consumption paths that induce the same level of cumulative domestic production
during this partition (such that Qt2 = Q2). The diﬀerence in total welfare generated by any two
such paths will then be given by the cumulative diﬀerence in the welfare ￿ows ￿ w(qt, ￿ qt).
Now consider a ￿xed quota that generates the same level of cumulative domestic production
A-1during the partition (such that Qt2 = Q2 under the quota). Further pick ￿ c such that ￿ q(￿ c,￿ c) is equal
to this quota level. Then, given ct, ￿ w[q(ct,￿ c + τ), ￿ q(ct,￿ c + τ)] is maximized when τ = η(ct − ￿ c);t h i s
is precisely the tariﬀ level generated by the quota (the reasoning is identical to the one developed
in the previous section). The welfare ￿ow ￿ w(.,.) at any point in time during the partition must
therefore be higher under the quota than under the tariﬀ. Since the domestic cost ct is always
higher under the tariﬀ (see footnote 22). Hence, a ￿xed tariﬀ is always dominated by a ￿xed quota
that induces the same amount of cumulative domestic production during the partition.
A-2Supplemental Appendix:
The Eﬀects of Discounting on Total Welfare Comparisons
Some derivations in the paper assumed a negligible discount rate in order to simplify the com-
parison of total welfare levels under diﬀerent policy scenarios. Given any of the policy instrument
restrictions considered in the paper, an increase in the exogenous discount rate will aﬀect the opti-
mal protection levels by making protection less valuable.1 On the other hand, any reasonably low
discount rate will not qualitatively aﬀect the total welfare comparisons derived in the paper.
When the eﬀects of discounting are explicitly modeled, total welfare TW over the planning
period can still be decomposed into the accumulated welfare ￿ows W and the ￿xed learning cost
FLC in the following way:
TW =
Z T
0
e−ρtWtdt
=
Z T
0
e−ρt [U(qt, ￿ qt) − ﬂ cqt − ￿ c￿ qt]dt −
Z T
0
e−ρt [c(Qt) − ﬂ c)qt]dt
=
Z T
0
e−ρt [U(qt, ￿ qt) − ﬂ cqt − ￿ c￿ qt]dt − α
Z ﬂ Q
0
[c(Qt) − ﬂ c]dt.
=
Z T
0
e−ρt ﬂ w(qt, ￿ qt)dt − α • FLC
where (qt, ￿ qt) is any consumption path such that learning occurs and ends at a time ﬂ t before the
end of the planning period T,a n dα is some number between e−ρt and 1.2 Similarly, when the
domestic good is not produced, total welfare would then be written:
TW0 =
Z T
0
e−ρt ﬂ w
¡
0, ￿ q0¢
dt =
Z T
0
e−ρtW0dt.
Optimal Protection Versus No Protection
Given a positive level of domestic production, let (q∗
t, ￿ q∗
t) be the optimal consumption paths un-
der protection (the trade instruments used to protect may be restricted in the ways previously
discussed.) The decision to protect the domestic industry then depends on the comparison of the
total welfare levels TW∗ =
R T
0 e−ρt ﬂ w(q∗
t, ￿ q∗
t)dt−α•FLC and TW0 =
R T
0 e−ρtW0dt. Higher welfare
￿ows ﬂ w(q∗
t, ￿ q∗
t) ≥ W0 must again be weighed against the learning cost α • FLC.
1A st h ed i s c o u n tr a t ea p p r o a c h e si n ￿nity, no protection would always be optimal.
2α will depend on both the discount rate ρ and the consumption paths (qt, ￿ qt).
SA-1Comparative statics involving the level of product diﬀerentiation will aﬀect the diﬀerence be-
tween ﬂ w(q∗
t, ￿ q∗
t) and W0 in the same way as was previously derived. Since this comparison involves
the ￿ows at each point in time, the discounting of these ￿ows will not aﬀect the comparisons. Sim-
ilarly, comparative statics involving the shape of the learning curve will aﬀect FLC in an identical
way as was previously derived. The only problem will be that these comparative statics will also
aﬀect the level of α. Given a small discount rate and a relatively short learning phase, this change
in α will be dominated by the changes in the welfare ￿ows or the learning cost FLC.T h u s , t h e
eﬀects of product diﬀerentiation, the length of the planning period, cost bounds, and shape of
the learning curve on the choice to protect the infant industry will remain unchanged under any
reasonable discounting.
Fixed Tariﬀ Versus Fixed Quota
In the paper, it was shown that given certain conditions on the shape of the utility function and the
shape of the learning curve, the welfare ￿ow ﬂ w(qt, ￿ qt) generated by the ￿xed quota at ﬂ ￿ q is always
higher than the welfare ￿ow generated by any ￿xed tariﬀ. The discounting of these ￿ows in the
total welfare computation will not aﬀect the total welfare ranking of the quota and tariﬀ: later
diﬀerences in the ￿ows will just count less than earlier diﬀerences, but these diﬀerences will still
always have the same sign favoring the quota. On the other hand, the values of α entering into
the total welfare computation will now be slightly diﬀerent under the quota and the tariﬀ.T h e
learning cost α • FLC under the two instruments will no longer be identical and will not cancel
each other out in the total welfare comparisons. Again, these changes in α will be small and will
be dominated by the diﬀerence in the welfare ￿ows. The comparison of total welfare under the two
instruments will be very unlikely to be reversed by the inclusion of these discounting eﬀects.
SA-2